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Abstract: 
 
This paper argues that, in the September 1992 European currency crisis, market trends in derivatives, in 
terms of price volatility and change in volumes traded, might have represented an early indicator, in 
reference to the spot market, of the lack of confidence in the ability of the Italian Lira and the Sterling 
Pound to maintain their parities within the ERM. The assessment is made by comparing the daily data on 
Italian/English interbank rates with the implicit yield on short-term interest rate futures and with a 
maximum compatible with the ERM band created by means of German interbank rates and changes in the 
exchange rates 
 
JEL:codes: F31; G14. 
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THE CREDIBILITY OF THE EXCHANGE RATE REGIME: AN ANALYSIS 
THROUGH “DERIVATIVES” OF THE SEPTEMBER 1992 CRISIS * 
 
 
1. Premise and conclusions  
This paper discusses the September 1992 currency crisis, which while it directly effected 
the Italian Lira and the Sterling Pound, involved the entire ERM system as well. This 
episode opens the way to an analysis of the rationale behind the behavior of operators in 
a specific, innovative and highly-specialized area of the financial markets, namely, 
derivatives, on the assumption that this market provided an early warning and, in some 
ways, a guide, compared to trading on the spot market. 
In section 4, we shall see that the crisis was actually anticipated by the appearance of 
alterations in arbitrage relationships between the interbank, the short-term interest rate 
futures markets and a maximum interest rate compatible with the highest depreciation 
the currency was allowed within the fluctuation band under the terms of the ERM. 
These changes indicate the lack of faith in the Italian Lira to remain in the ERM band 
starting from the beginning of June, as well as for the Sterling signify a great deal of 
uncertainty in the period corresponding to the last few days of August. 
As it is clear from sections 2 and 3, short-term expectations in the financial markets 
reflect the underlying dynamics of the fundamentals. From this point of view, we 
highlight the drawbacks of the nominal anchor theory as a means to acquire credibility 
by policy makers short on legitimacy, and we point to the discrepancies between 
nominal and real rates as signs for a future realignment, so as to characterize the 
September 1992 storm as an “announced crisis”. 
 
2. The European Monetary Union: theoretical justifications 
From May 1987 (date of the French Franc’s last realignment) to September 1992, the 
ERM proved to be an apparently credible system; it obtained significant results both by 
creating an area of relative monetary stability and  effectively contributing to reduce 
                                                          
* The authors wish to thank Giancarlo Corsetti (III University of Rome) and Fabio Fornari (Research 
Office Bank of Italy) for their indispensable contribution in writing section 4, as well as two anonymous 
referees for their useful comments. Any shortcomings are the authors’ own fault. 
A previous version of this paper was presented at a conference organized by the Department of 
Economics of the University of Ancona under the supervision  of Prof. Pietro Alessandrini on The market 
for derivative products: evolution, stability and control (Nov. 1995). 
Even though the paper resulted from a joint effort, sections 1, 2, 3 are to be attributed to G. Garofalo 
while F.Barbato is responsible for section 4. 
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inflation in Europe1. In 1986, with the signing of the European Single Act, the 
Community started removing controls on capital movements  and the remaining non-
tariff barriers to trade as well as creating  an integrated market in banking and financial 
services. 
However, these actions emphasized the growing incompatibility risks among the a) 
complete freedom of trade; b) total capital mobility; c) fixed exchange rates; d) little 
coordination of national monetary policies. 
Considerations based on economic theory as well as empirical evidence show that the 
four elements of the “irreconcilable quartet” cannot coexist; thus, at least one must be 
abandoned2. Keeping the first three in place, it is possible to give up  autonomy in 
national monetary policies and pursue the creation of a monetary union3. This is clearly 
the chosen path in the European Union Treaty (Maastricht). 
This choice was supported by theoretical explanations that, on the basis of the rational 
expectations hypothesis, demonstrate how “by tying their hands” public authorities limit 
their discretionary actions and acquire credibility in their fight against inflation4. As is 
well known, the question is related to the time inconsistency5 issue in the pursuit of 
optimal policies, which is the dynamic equivalent of Lucas’s criticism. 
Through the game theory, the time consistency solution can be defined as “Nash 
equilibrium” (or non-cooperative equilibrium point) in which no player can do better, 
given the  strategy of the other. Time-inconsistent policies represent instead 
“Stackelberg equilibria”, where authorities act as leaders thanks to information 
advantages and have an incentive to “cheat”, thus to abandon the equilibrium point 
previously reached6. To achieve a better result of the Nash equilibrium in Pareto terms, 
the game should be made cooperative, though this is impossible due to the atomistic 
nature of the private sector. Given that the Stackelberg solution is unattainable in 
situations of perfect information, it is necessary that policy makers and operators enter 
                                                                                                                                                                          
The paper was financed with a 60% MURST contribution.  
1 The average inflation rate in member countries decreased from 11% in 1980 to 2% in 1986. The 
difference between the highest and the lowest inflation rates diminished from 16 to 6 percentage points. 
2 Cfr. H.G.Wallich (1972) and T. Padoa Schioppa (1992). 
3 See the Delors Report published in 1990 entitled “One Market, One Money”, European Economy, n.44. 
4 Cfr. F.Giavazzi and M.Pagano 1988; P. De Grauwe (1990 and 1992); T.Lane and L.Rojas-Suarez 
(1992). 
5 Cfr. F. Kydland and E.C.Prescott (1977). 
 
6 Cfr. J.W. Friedman (1986). 
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into an agreement that helps the system achieve its “natural” equilibrium by stabilizing 
expectations. The government effort can be confirmed by its reputation, besides laws or 
time-tested customs and conventions: in this case the incentive not to comply with the 
terms of the agreement must be more than compensated by the greater expected future 
costs generated by the loss of credibility7.  
It is not possible here to proceed with an accurate rebuttal of this approach. What must 
be pointed out, however, is that the concept of credibility must be set against a larger 
background that takes into account the benefits involved in the implementation of 
economic policies8, as well as their costs9. Rational operators tend to anticipate the 
consequences of restrictive measures trying to subdue inflation by assessing their long-
term sustainability. If they expect that future considerations related to the cost of 
unemployment10 may lead to reconsider decisions made on economic policies, despite 
government assurance to the contrary, they will determine a differential in interest rates11 
as well as capital outflows, thus confirming expectations in advance.  
In our country, for a number of reasons that cannot be investigated here (we will only 
point to the existence of “weak governments” with multi-party coalitions, unable to 
                                                          
7 S. Fischer (1990) emphasizes the existence, in a loss of authority function characterized by a stochastic 
disturbance unforeseen by operators, of a trade-off between the benefits deriving from dynamic 
consistency and the costs due to the absence of flexibility following the adoption of a strict monetary rule. 
8 Besides policy makers’ greater dislike for unemployment than  inflation, a government is interested in 
increasing the “inflation tax” in order to reduce the public debt. See A.L. Bovenberg, J.M. Kremers and 
P.R. Masson (1991) on this point. 
9 Cfr. P.R. Masson (1995). 
10 There is a “real unemployment cost” that cannot be defined in purely financial terms. Considering the 
loss of potential output and using a number of indicators to correct the measurement (average output of 
employed workforce; trend in the growth rate for a period - from the mid-60’s to the early 70’s - 
characterized by conditions of near full employment; implicit output-unemployment elasticity in Okun’s 
law) we can conclude that for each percentage point in the rate of unemployment there is a 1 percent loss 
in GDP. An estimate of the real cost of unemployment in U.K  and in the U.S.A is available in G.Dawson 
(1992). 
11 An indicator of credibility’s structural deficit is provided by the persistence on a long-term basis 
(markets are said to be  “short-sighted and  long on memory”) of a relatively constant difference between 
interest rate differentials and price differentials (a sort of “hard core” interest differential, after deducting 
the inflation rate). In the 1985-’95 decade, Italian securities carried a 3 percent “risk premium” over 
Germany’s, compared to 1,5 - 2 percentage points between France and Germany. It must be noted that, 
before the currency crisis, in the 1990-’91 two-year period the gap between Italy and Germany, in a 
manner “inconsistent” with the trend, closed. Actually, there was even a small negative value, which was 
eventually corrected. Noteworthy is the result of the analysis of the same indicators in the comparison 
between the U.S.A and Germany. This highlights a clear reversal from marginally positive values to 
highly negative ones starting from the late 1980’s-early 1990’s with  -5, -6 percentage point peaks right 
during the ERM storm (that was the start of a sharp depreciation of the dollar that would characterize the 
first half of the 1990’s): such reversal is a clear sign of the redefinition of the relationship between the 
most powerful countries on both sides of the Atlantic, with the resulting turbulence as far as relations are 
concerned within the European area.      
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resist pressures from different social and interest groups and, thus, not in the position to 
keep the State’s budget under control12), credibility has been sought by policy makers 
more through conventions or laws than custom. Reputation has then been pursued by 
public authorities more through self-imposed constraints than by their own conduct. It is 
in this framework that many Europe-oriented choices have been made in Italy; among 
these the idea to utilize the exchange rate as a nominal anchor, with the implication that 
the monetary policy should seek to attract a capital inflow consistent with the chosen 
parity. 
Given the objective, subordinate role with respect to Germany, the type of monetary 
framework discussed above, valid for the majority of European countries, must defer to 
the monetarist policy of the country that is at the center of the system; this policy, since 
1975, has been characterized by the setting of an "intermediate" objective in terms of 
quantity of money (growth of M3) and a “final” objective consisting in price stability1314, 
to be achieved by making use of a wide range of instruments (repurchase agreements, 
currency swaps, below-market rate financing, marginal refinancing and mandatory 
reserves15). 
 
 
3. An announced crisis 
The euphoria of the moment led to an over-exaggeration, on one hand, of the stability of 
exchange rates as an external constraint to keep inflation in check and to reduce  public 
debt, and, on the other, of the free circulation of capital as an opportunity to provide 
financing to national enterprises as well as a means to finance deficits in the balance of 
trade. Before 1992, however, the prevailing view made a minority out of those who 
                                                          
12 The benefits of exogenous institutional changes aimed at keeping public expenditures under the 
government’s full control are outlined in P.R. Agènor and M.P. Taylor (1992). 
13 Although the monetary growth objective has been missed six times in the last twenty years, the 
Bundesbank’s reputation was guaranteed by the stability achieved throughout the 1955-’94 forty-year 
period, with a 3.2% average annual increase in consumer prices, vis-à-vis 4.4% in the USA,  6.0% in 
France, 6.8% in the United Kingdom, 7.7% in Italy. It is this historical legacy, together with Germany’s 
leadership within the ERM, that allowed the Bundesbank to save its own credibility in the  period  
following Germany’s unification, despite its temporary exceeding the limit of monetary growth.  
14 It can be useful to compare the Bundesbank’s rule with that adopted in the U.S.A. where monetary 
authorities build up their credibility through custom and a consistent behavior over time. In the latter case 
there are many statistical indicators and the basic objective is to cope with inflation in the medium term.  
It is appropriate to mention also  inflation targeting since the United Kingdom, Sweden, Finland, and more 
recently Spain, resorted to it between the end of 1992 and the beginning of 1993, following the European 
currency crisis. 
15 See EMI, Annual Report, 1994. 
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raised the question of compatibility between national monetary policies and the 
underlying economic structure as well as other economic policies (budget policy, 
income policy, structural reforms) in the different countries. Only later was the 
awareness of the project’s limits to gain wider currency 16 17. 
Noteworthy for the evaluation of  the credibility of the economic policy regime implicit 
in the Maastricht’s program, during the time-frame that is at the center of our attention, 
are the positions of those who saw the need for a “last realignment” for some countries 
before entering the EMU, in order to correct the real appreciation accumulated during 
the fixed parity period18. 
The summing-up throughout the years of inflation differentials, not corrected in a 
framework of nominal rates pegged to administrative parameters, produced an 
appreciation in the real exchange rate of the weak currencies (Sterling, Lira, Peseta, 
Drachma) with the ensuing loss in their exports’ competitiveness19. In the second quarter 
of 1992, the real exchange rate for Italy, in comparison to other EEC countries, was 
2.7%, 4.8% and 7.9% higher than the average 1987 value, depending on the indicator 
selected, based on producer prices, average export value per unit  and labor cost per unit, 
respectively20. 
A confirmation of the discrepancy between nominal exchange rates and real exchange 
rates is given by the difference between the former and the Purchasing Power Parity 
(PPP); this represents the theoretical value of the exchange rate that allows to 
compensate for accumulated inflation differentials starting from a base period (January 
1987 for the Lira; October 1989, the AEC membership date, for the Sterling)21. In June 
1992, the PPP  was close to 840 Lira per DM, if calculated on the basis of consumer 
prices, 776 Lira if in reference to producer prices, an overvaluation of 11 percent and 3 
                                                          
16 Among the many interventions of the “revisionist” current the following can be mentioned: M.Pivetti  
(1992), H.Riese (1993), R. Azzolini and U. Marani (1993),  A. Graziani (1994),  M. De Cecco (1994), L. 
Bosco, R. Tamborini and F. Targetti (1994-1995). 
17 Noteworthy is the opinion in L.E.O.Svensson (1993, p. 20): “Fixed exchange rates now seem much less 
effective as means to price stability than many of us thought before. Therefore, monetary stability and 
credibility has to be built at home with other means...Fixed exchange rates may be a complement to 
monetary stability and credibility at home..., although they are not a substitute. They are simply neither 
necessary, nor sufficient for credible price stability”. 
18 Cfr. K.A. Froot and K. Rogoff (1991); L. Spaventa (1992).   
19 The figure on page 30 in the 1993 Report of the Bank of Italy may be of some interest. 
20 The Bank of Italy’s elaborations on OECD, IMF and Istat data are reported in the Bollettino Economico 
n. 19, 1992. 
21 Elaborations on the OECD data are in CER Report n. 4, 1992. 
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percent, respectively, compared to the exchange rate parity. Both PPP’s were clearly out 
of the ERM fluctuation band. 
The same thing can be said for the Sterling Pound; in this case both PPP’s were slightly 
above 0.36 per DM at the date indicated, a 6.5% overvaluation with respect to the spot 
rate. Nor was the situation much different for Greece, Spain and Portugal, while 
Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Denmark and, from the end of 1991, following 
the previous dramatic realignment, France showed a substantial stability in their own 
real exchange rates compared to the DM. 
The behavior of the different players during the currency crisis deserves a careful 
reflection. The size of capital flows and the speed with which they move among the 
countries that participate to the European currency agreements cannot be understood 
unless there is some background information. Starting from 1987, financial operations 
among EEC residents, the cross-border investments, increased substantially. These 
transactions were part of an international diversification strategy of the investment 
portfolio that sought to profit from  interest rate differentials among the different 
countries. In the countries whose economies and currencies were weaker22, these 
investments were guaranteed by: a very low exchange rate risk, equal to the extent of 
fluctuations from parity; currency support measures by the EEC central banks also 
through interventions agreed upon within the European Monetary Cooperation Fund, the 
so-called very short-term financing facilities (VSTFF); the possibility to be protected 
from exchange rate risks by adopting cross-hedging strategies. 
During July and August 199223, international and domestic private capital started 
abandoning the currency denomination that was considered weak and about to 
depreciate. Starting from the first days of September, the expected depreciation, caused 
by a general decrease in confidence in the ERM parity (we shall see that the bad news 
came from the Bath conference), turned into a devaluation forecast that paved  the way 
for the speculative attack. 
                                                          
22 Think of the financial boom in Spain at the end of the 1980’s. 
 
23 A factor often mentioned is the negative result of the Danish referendum held in June 1992 for the 
ratification of the Maastricht Treaty and the growing uncertainty on the result of the referendum set for 
September 20 in France. 
As far as Italy is concerned, however, the preliminary phase of the crisis can be traced back to the month 
of June; the political and economic events that took place during that month are described in section 4.1.  
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The varying behavior of operators in the preliminary stage can be reconstructed with a 
certain degree of approximation. The hedge funds adopted two hedging strategies: on 
the one hand they sold in the forward market the weak currency in which the funds were 
denominated; and, on the other hand, they took a position in interest rate futures traded 
in London and Paris in order to hedge against the great volatility of interest rates typical 
of countries facing a devaluation risk. The majority of institutional investors, instead, 
continued buying securities denominated in the weak currency, hedging by taking an 
equivalent position in DM, so as to take advantage of interest rate differentials with a 
limited exchange rate risk. Besides a possible direct participation in speculative 
operations against their national currency, the banking system of the countries with a 
depreciating currency limited their activities to extending credit lines to those operators 
trying to liquidate long positions in the weak currency: such operations on the spot, 
swap and forward markets turned out to be extremely profitable both for the customer 
and the banking system. 
Meanwhile the central banks of the countries facing  difficulties intervened directly in 
the foreign exchange market to defend their own currency. They raised  interest rates 
both to discourage the growing demand for credit and to make investments in national 
securities more profitable, thus encouraging the  purchase of the currency in the spot 
market on the one hand and reducing the sale of securities in portfolio on the other24. 
The Bath conference, held on September 5 between Finance Ministers of EEC countries 
and central bank representatives, is the most likely turning point between the 
preliminary phase described above and the real crisis. In that occasion the Bundesbank’s 
governor, H. Schlesinger, refused once again to yield to the request of the other member 
countries who were urging Germany to reduce its interest rates. The renewed 
unwillingness to cut its interest rates made it plain that Germany intended to proceed 
toward a realignment  of the parities within the ERM, thus abandoning a support policy 
for depreciating currencies carried out in the month of August. To international 
operators it was clear that the common policies pursued by central banks in order to 
defend the exchange rate parity was faltering. The weak currencies, already substantially 
                                                          
24 The conduct of the Bank of Italy is described in the previously mentioned Bollettino Economico, n. 19, 
1992 and in the Report 1993.  
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depreciated, were potentially headed for devaluation without a German guarantee: the 
“unusual” movement of funds made it clear that a speculative attack was in the making. 
The timing of the crisis was most telling. The first currency to face difficulties was the 
Finnish markka, which had unilaterally been pegged to the ECU: on September 8, 
announcing that it would float, depreciated by 15%. On September 13 the Italian Lira  
was devalued by 7% while the Spanish Peseta followed suit with a 5% devaluation on 
September 17. On September 17 the Italian Lira and the Sterling Pound abandoned the 
ERM25. The crisis spread out26 to involve the French Franc, the Belgian Franc, the 
Danish Kroner, the Dutch Guilder, the Swedish Kroner27, the Norwegian Kroner, the 
Irish Sterling, the Portuguese Escudo and again the Spanish Peseta and the Italian Lira,  
perhaps in view of a possible return to the ERM in a short period of time. 
The events involving the French Franc are interesting as there was  the formal survival 
of the exchange rate agreement at stake. After being forced to hover around the 
minimum fluctuation values between September 17 and September 23, the French 
currency edged up again thanks to the political agreement reached in Paris after a 
meeting between F. Mitterand and H. Kohl, and thanks also to the reserve hemorrhage 
by both the Bank of France and the Bundesbank.    
The nature of the speculative movements must be accurately defined. In fact, it is not 
possible to talk simply of sudden changes in the expectations of a devaluation for a 
single currency because there is a strong incidence of systemic factors related to the 
credibility of the exchange rate regime, as well as the degree of coordination of national 
monetary policies that occurs during a crisis, the latter representing a factor for the 
stabilization of expectations28.  
                                                          
25 After realizing that nothing  could be done to prevent the Pound from decreasing even further, the 
British government, on the evening of 16 September, unilaterally decided to temporarily suspend the 
currency from the ERM. In the morning of the following day, in the wake of this decision, the Italian 
monetary authorities ordered the official foreign exchange market closed until September 22.  
26 Cfr. M.Goldstein, D. Folkerts-Landau, P. Garber, L. Rojas-Suarez, M. Spencer (1993). 
27 The depreciation of the SK, unilaterally pegged to the ECU, vis-à-vis the DM was limited to 3% thanks 
to the dramatic decision by the Riksbank (the leading interest rate was raised to 500% in mid-September, 
and was reduced to 15.5% in mid-October), given the possibilities made available by the low inflation rate 
and by the low public debt level.   
28 The framework for the analysis is given by the literature on currency crises. See on the one hand the 
positions of the school of thought that refers to Krugman (1979), stressing  rational choices by  
speculators in the presence of limits on the availability of foreign exchange reserves, and on the other 
hand the positions taken in M. Obstfeld (1994), F. Ozkan and A. Sutherland (1994), W.H. Buiter, G. 
Corsetti and P. Pesenti (1996) who refer to rational choices by policy makers, taking into account both 
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Within this context the “derivatives’” role is paramount. If in normal conditions they 
have a stabilizing  influence on the underlying markets, allowing prices to adjust more 
rapidly to a change in factors that affect demand and supply, in times of tension they 
tend to increase the short-term volatility of prices. This reinforces the initial shock 
through feedback effects both on hedging positions, by setting in motion dynamic 
hedging techniques calling for purchases in spot markets where prices are rising and 
selling in those where prices are falling, and  speculative positions by creating possible 
“speculative bubbles”29. The extreme sensitivity and the timeliness of the “derivatives” 
market’s response to changes in expectations and/or in the economic variables must be 
attributed to the particular characteristics of these financial instruments. In fact, besides 
being actively traded and having a low transaction cost, a leverage and a particularly 
high risk/reward ratio, these instruments can  be utilized either to hedge against an 
unfavorable change in price or for speculative purposes and short-term financial 
investments. The different objectives pursued by operators generate a highly composite 
demand for “derivatives” that, as it results from a variety of purposes, is always 
sensitive also to a peculiar external input. 
Compared to the more complex, long-term credibility assessments, previously proposed, 
namely the general consistency of the exchange rate regime, the persistence in time of a 
difference between interest rate differential and price differential, the accumulation of 
discrepancies between nominal and real exchange rates, the prevailing tendency on the 
financial markets is to be guided by more direct parameters with a short-term horizon. It 
is on one of these that we intend to dwell in the next section. 
 
4. The scope of the research and the arbitrage principles utilized to define the 
credibility analysis 
In a study carried out in July 1994, J.M. Campa and P.H.K. Chang reviewed the degree 
of credibility of the fluctuation band of the Sterling Pound/Deutsche Mark exchange rate 
in operators’ expectations between October 1990 and August 1992. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
costs and benefits associated to maintaining/abandoning parity, besides inflationary expectations by the 
private sector given a reputational game structure.   
29 Cfr. Bank for International Settlements, Economic Bulletin, n. 24, 1995. 
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In this period, which includes the 22-month stay of the Sterling in the fluctuation band 
set between a + 6.18% / - 5.82%30 range from the declared ERM parity, the two authors 
analyzed the change in value of the option contract on the Sterling Pound /Deutsche 
Mark exchange rate. 
The data  reviewed - the daily average bid-ask prices of the option contract - were 
compared with  a corresponding theoretical maximum daily value determined on the 
basis of the maximum depreciation compatible with the fluctuation band of the ERM 
parity for the Sterling Pound against the Deutsche Mark. 
The value of the exchange rate call option at the closing T of the contract with a strike 
price equal to K is: 
 
[ 1 ] Callt ,T = Max [ 0 , St  ] 
 
where St  is the value in Sterling Pounds of 1 DM at the time t. 
With the participation of the Sterling Pound to the ERM, and with a fluctuation band 
deemed credible by operators, the maximum value the call option could reach at the  
maturity date T was (S°- K), where S° represented the limit of the maximum 
depreciation allowed for the Sterling Pound against the Deutsche Mark in the ERM.  
Thus, given the credibility of the band, the value of the call option at the time t should 
have been lower than (S°- K) / (1 + rt ,T ), namely the maximum value discounted for the 
time t. 
Should  the value of the call option (average bid-ask price) for a given period be higher 
than the maximum discounted value for the same period, it would indicate a condition 
of imperfect credibility for the parity fluctuation band, thus disrupting the arbitrage 
relationships at the basis of this test. 
The option contracts for which a credibility analysis was performed were the 1-month 
call option, the 3-month call option and the 6-month call option. The first two contracts 
revealed only brief and occasional disruptions of the credibility condition, particularly  
in the period preceding the  Sterling Pound’s departure from the ERM (see figures 1 (a) 
and 1 (b) ). The test run on the 6-month call option showed instead a clear lack of 
                                                          
30 The participation of the Sterling Pound to the ERM, with a wider range around parity, was ratified on 
October 8, 1990. 
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confidence by operators in the ability of the Sterling Pound to remain in the fluctuation 
band (see fig. 1 (c) ). The lack of credibility was very strong throughout 1992, with the 
only exception for the months of May and June. 
By following the methodology adopted by Campa and Chang in their study, an attempt 
was made to derive an application of the analysis on short-term interest rate futures. 
There are two reasons for choosing interest rate futures. On the one hand, as we set out 
to analyze the credibility of the Italian Lira within the ERM band, the only existing 
futures that could provide any information is the 3-month Eurolira traded on the LIFFE 
in London, due to the lack of exchange rate futures on the Lira. On the other hand, we 
intended to study arbitrage relationships, thus the correlation between the yields on Lira 
deposits both in the Euromarket and the Italian interbank market. 
The analysis was then extended to the Short Sterling futures, the futures market for 
interbank deposits in Sterling Pounds, in order to evaluate its significance also with 
respect to the British currency. Thus, it was possible to compare the results with the 
outcome on the Eurolira futures, keeping in mind that the two currencies had different 
fluctuation ranges within the ERM band (+2.275% and -2.225% for the Italian Lira, 
+6.18% and -5.82% for the Sterling Pound ), as well as more directly with the 
conclusions reached by Campa and Chang. 
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    Fig. 1(a) - Credibility analysis on 1-Month Call Option 
 
 
 
    Fig. 1(b) - Credibility analysis on 3-Month Call Option 
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    Fig. 1(c) - Credibility analysis on 6-Month Call Option 
 
 
The two credibility analyses on the futures were carried out by taking into consideration 
the futures’ daily closing  prices in the months preceding the exit of the Italian Lira and 
the Sterling Pound from the ERM. 
The price of a short-term interest rate futures contract in a given day is determined on 
the basis of the interest rate for the period considered. Thus, to calculate the theoretical 
equilibrium price of a 3-month futures, the three-month interest rate must be 
determined: 
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where  i T,T1  and  i T,T2  are the interest rates at the  time T with maturities at T1 and  T2,  
respectively; T1  is the last trading day of the chosen delivery period and T2 - T1 is equal 
to 3 months. Thus, if for example T1-T is equal to 3 months, yT1,T2 (implicit yield) 
represents a 3 month interest rate 3 months hence. 
The futures price is then derived by subtracting  yT1,T2  from 100 : 
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[ 3 ] ft = 100 - yT1,T2 
 
The test on the two currencies called for the daily analysis of the implicit yield (yt)31, 
which can be obtained  through [3] from the daily closing of future prices. 
The daily (closing) implicit yield for both the Eurolira and  Short Sterling  must be 
lower than or equal to the Italian interbank interest rate and  the British interbank 
interest rate, respectively, so as to prevent arbitrage transactions between the two 
markets (interbank and futures) from occurring. In fact, if yt is greater than the interbank 
interest rate (it) the arbitrageur might borrow in the interbank market and take a long 
position on the futures contract, thus making an arbitrage profit equal to  yt - it  when the 
implicit yield goes back in line with the interbank rate, owing to arbitrage pressures in 
the two markets. 
In outlining arbitrage relationships, it was assumed that arbitrageurs would compare the 
two interest rates, expressed on an annual basis, keeping in mind the time interval 
between the trading day and the maturity date of the futures contract. 
Thus, for instance, for a futures contract maturing on September 14, 1992, the implicit 
yield quoted on June 14, 1992 refers to a 3-month interest rate starting 3 months from 
now, or theoretically included between September 14, 1992 and December 14, 1992, 
that in terms of arbitrage,  is compared to the interbank interest rate at 3 months, that is,  
the period valid from June 14, 1992 to 14 September,1992. This means that, in 
determining the profitability of their transactions, arbitrageurs look at  the 3-month 
interbank interest rate three months before the maturity of the future; the one-month 
interbank interest rate one month before maturity; the 15-day interbank rate fifteen days 
before maturity, etc. 
The construction of the curve  it , therefore, took into account rates quoted on different 
dates and compatible with the expiration of future contracts. 
The two curves  it  and  yt  so determined, with  it≥ yt  for every t, were compared with a 
maximum  interest rate compatible with the highest depreciation the currency was 
allowed within the fluctuation band under the terms of the ERM. 
                                                          
31 In what follows the implicit yield is indicated by  yt , where t indicates the day of the quotation of the 
future. 
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The analytical expression of the  maximum interest rate is: 
 
[ 4 ] i i
S S
S gt t
t
t
∗ = +
°−
∗




360  
 
where  i
t
 is the German interbank interest rate expressed on an annual basis and with a 
maturity structure similar to it ; (S°-St )/St represents the change, in percentage terms, at 
the time t, of the currency from the maximum depreciation allowed with respect to the 
Deutsche Mark within the fluctuation band; g ,days that with time t indicate the 
expiration of the future contract. 
Thus, [4] represents the maximum cost, in terms of currency depreciation, of an 
arbitrage transaction at the time t with financing obtained in the German interbank 
market, an investment in the national currency on the futures market for Italian and 
British interest rates and hedging the loan contracted in DM. 
In arbitrage terms there can be two relationships between the interest rates under 
consideration: 
 
1)  i i yt t t∗ > ≥  ; 
2)  i y it t t≥ > ∗  ; 
 
The former indicates the condition of credibility for the ERM parity’s fluctuation band. 
Confidence in the band is expressed by the negative value given by  y i
t t
−
∗  ed  i i
t t
−
∗  , or 
by the existence of the arbitrage relationship between the German interbank market and 
the future and interbank markets of the currency being analyzed.  
On the other hand, the latter shows a lack of credibility in the band. As  y i
t t
−
∗ ed  i i
t t
−
∗   
are positive there is a clear disruption of the arbitrage relationships considered. 
Contrary to the preceding, a third relationship in which i i yt t t> ≥∗  might express an 
anomalous condition. In fact, in terms of credibility, the information reflected by the 
positive result of i i
t t
−
∗  and by the negative result of y i
t t
−
∗ is conflicting. In the analysis 
we have performed, this situation has been verified for brief periods during phases of 
high uncertainty. 
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4.1 The Italian currency crisis and the 3-Month Eurolira Futures. Credibility 
analysis on the Italian Lira/Deutsche Mark exchange rate in the months before the 
Italian  currency’s devaluation   
Although the Bank of Italy’s foreign exchange reserves had been steadily diminishing 
since January ‘92, due to the instability of exchange rates, the first signs of the currency 
crisis appeared in the month of June when Italian government securities sharply 
decreased  first in the futures market and then in the spot market. 
Investors’ pessimism toward Lira-denominated securities originated in worries caused 
by some national political and economic events, such as: the lack of significant progress 
toward an improvement in public finance, the delay in the formation of a new 
government, the controversies on the new tax measures (especially concerning the 
“health tax”), the government announcement to proceed with the liquidation of EFIM 
without, however, repaying the latter’s debts, Moody’s downgrading (from AA1 to 
AA3) of Italy’s creditworthiness in the ranks of  industrialized countries. 
The liquidation of Lira-denominated positions starting from the month of June, together 
with the speculative wave that developed in the following months, gave rise to such a 
strong pressure on the Italian currency that devaluation became unavoidable on 
September 13, 1992.  
Table 1 lists the main events that characterized the Italian currency crisis, with a special 
emphasis on  the Bank of Italy’s interventions in the attempt to defend the Lira 
exchange-rate parity; in the last column, the Italian Lira/Deutsche Mark exchange rates 
outline the evolution of the Italian currency’s depreciation. 
The credibility analysis of the ERM fluctuation band for the Italian Lira/Deutsche Mark 
exchange rate is based on a comparison among the daily yields in the interbank market 
(it), the implicit yield (yt) and the maximum compatible with the band (it
∗ ), in the period 
between May 12, 1992 and September 14, 1992. 
The futures contracts under review were the 3-Month Eurolira maturing September ‘92, 
and the 3-Month Eurolira maturing December ‘92. 
The technical features of futures are described below: 
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Underlying Exchange Maturity Index Notional 
Value 
Type of 
Delivery 
Delivery 
Months 
Delivery 
Day 
Starting 
Date 
Euromarket Italian 
Lira time deposit 
LIFFE 3  months LIBOR 1  Billion Cash 
settlement 
March, 
June, 
September, 
December. 
First business 
day  prior 
third 
Wednesday 
May 
1992 
 
The results obtained by the analysis of credibility on contracts with a September and 
December, 1992 expiration date (see Figures 2 and 3) show the lack of faith in the Lira’s 
ability to remain in the ERM band. For the two contracts, the period differs in which the 
positive values of y i
t t
−
∗  and  i i
t t
−
∗  are obtained, obviously where there is an absence of 
credibility. This diversity conforms with that verified by the analysis of Champa and 
Chang for the English Sterling, where the absence of credibility is more explicit in 
contracts with long term options. 
Furthermore, the analysis on the volumes of Eurolira contracts maturing December 92 
traded in the month of September was particularly interesting. Data in Table 2 indicate 
the significant increment in volumes traded during the crucial four-day crisis, namely 
September 4, 9, 11 and 14. 
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Fig. 2 – LIFFE Eurolira maturing 09/92 
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Fig. 3 – LIFFE Eurolira maturing 12/92 
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      Table 1 - Events and Bank of Italy’s policy during the crisis 
 
 DATE EVENTS AND BANK OF ITALY’S POLICY EXCHANGE 
RATE 
1 DM=£ 
  4/6/92 The Bank of Italy raises the fixed-term rate from 12.5% 
to 13% 
756.03 
  5/7/92 The Bank of Italy raises the discount rate from 12% to 
13% and the fixed-term rate to 14.5% 
757.77  
11/7/92 The Government announces urgent measures to reduce 
the public deficit  
757.40  
16/7/92 The Bank of Italy raises the discount rate to 13.75% and 
the fixed-term rate to 15.25% 
760.75  
 31/7/92 Agreement among the social components and the 
Government on income policy, fight against inflation  
and  cost of labor 
756.33 
  4/8/92 The Bank of Italy lowers the discount rate to 13.25% and 
the fixed-term rate to 14.75% 
755.83  
  4/9/92 The Bank of Italy raises the discount rate to 15% and the 
fixed-term rate to 16.5%; announces a VSTFF, raises 
banking reserves from 5% to 10% of  deposits 
765.40  
  9/9/92  Prime Minister Amato requests emergency powers 764.55 
 11/9/92 Last trading day for the Lira before the devaluation 765.40 
 13/9/92 The Lira is devalued by 7% against ERM parity  - - - -  
 14/9/92 First day of trading for Lira after devaluation 793.32  
 17/9/92 Lira abandons ERM  843.00 
 1/10/92 The Bank of Italy announces a medium-term loan 
obtained within the framework of  the EEC’s monetary 
cooperation agreement 
879.00  
 6/10/92 Day of maximum depreciation for the Lira during the 
crisis 
927.00 
 9/10/92 The Bank of Italy decreases the fixed-term rate to 16%  876.27  
23/10/92 The Bank of Italy decreases the discount rate to 14% and 
the fixed-term rate to 15%. Reserve requirements on Lira 
denominated interbank deposits are repealed  
876.31  
26/10/92 The Bank of Italy issues for the first time a dollar 
denominated repurchase agreement 
868.62  
13/11/92 The Bank of Italy decreases the discount rate to 13% and 
the fixed-term rate to 14% 
854.50  
23/12/92 The Bank of Italy decreases the discount rate to 12% and 
the fixed-term rate to 13% 
896.31 
 
In particular, in the last trading day (September 11) before the devaluation, volumes 
increased by 67 percent compared to the previous day, thus determining a 17.35 percent 
implicit yield. The day following the devaluation the implicit yield fell by 3.32 percent 
to 14.03 percent. 
The great volatility of the implicit yield was a recurring feature in the days between the 
devaluation of the Lira and its exit from the ERM. In fact, it was so remarkable that on 
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September 16 alone the futures yield varied by 4.2 percentage points, representing the 
difference between the highest and the lowest price.   
 
    Table 2 - September prices of Eurolira Futures maturing December ‘92 
 
Date Opening 
Price 
Settlement 
Price 
Highest 
 Price 
  Lowest 
Price 
Open  
interest 
Volume 
Traded 
Implicit 
yield 
  1/9/92 84,62 84,48 84,62 84,39 5983 1090 15,52 
  2/9/92 84,30 84,62 84,64 84,28 6096 861 15,38 
  3/9/92 84,55 84,80 84,83 84,50 6324 872 15,20 
  4/9/92 84,90 85,10 85,25 84,65 7238 3263 14,90 
  7/9/92 85,10 84,88 85,25 84,81 7275 894 15,12 
  8/9/92 84,45 84,55 84,66 84,35 7859 2346 15,45 
  9/9/92 84,00 84,55 84,75 83,50 8857 3342 15,45 
10/9/92 84,40 83,60 84,40 83,60 9567 2310 16,40 
11/9/92  83,65 82,65 83,65 82,08 9599 3859 17,35 
14/9/92 85,25 85,97 87,40 85,40 9727 4600 14,03 
15/9/92 85,90 83,95 85,90 83,25 10591 3978 16,05 
16/9/92 83,40 86,10 86,10 81,90 10320 3473 13,90 
17/9/92 85,60 86,78 87,10 84,45 9991 2210 13,22 
18/9/92 87,10 86,90 87,10 86,40 9947 1778 13,10 
21/9/92 86,70 86,28 86,70 85,78 9849 1604 13,72 
22/9/92 86,23 86,73 86,60 86,00 9890 1693 13,27 
23/9/92 86,75 86,58 87,15 86,45 9840 2069 13,42 
24/9/92 86,58 85,65 86,58 85,30 9944 2309 14,35 
25/9/92 85,45 85,84 85,90 85,05 9677 1538 14,16 
28/9/92 85,70 85,59 85,80 85,40 9581 653 14,41 
29/9/92 85,50 85,50 85,50 85,30 9601 828 14,50 
30/9/92 85,20 85,34 85,49 84,50 9421 1843 14,66 
 
The variability of the volumes traded, in the days preceding the devaluation, with 
respect to the implicit yields quoted raises some questions concerning the  behavior of  
the operators who took a position in the futures contract.  
The increment of volumes traded in the days preceding September 13 is directly 
attributable to the increase in  speculative positions taken by operators. If on the one 
hand this explains the increment of the positions on the long side of the market, on the 
other the equivalent rise in short positions, necessary for market equilibrium purposes, is 
less clear. In fact, for instance, an operator who on September 11 had taken a short 
position by selling futures at 82.65, in case of a devaluation of the Lira, would have lost 
money by closing his position in any day following the devaluation. 
With particular reference to the days  between the Bath conference (September 5) and 
the devaluation of the Lira (September 13), the explanation in terms  of “physiological” 
movements of the market is not convincing. It would mean, in fact, to state that the 
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speculative wave (long positions) originating in the weakness of the Lira was offset by 
an opposing speculative trend (short positions), that is by operators who, while betting 
on an increase in interest rates, continued to hold short positions  also when it was time 
to close them. 
A more convincing reason is given by the need to hedge some operators might have had 
in such a risky period in terms of profit and yield variability. 
In an effort to protect themselves from the risks associated with a speculative exposure, 
investors with securities and cash balances denominated in a strong currency, to be 
converted at a later date, may have utilized the Eurolira futures market to secure a partial 
cover, thus implementing a mixed hedging and speculation strategy. By taking a short 
position, in fact, in case of a further increase in interest rates and a strengthening of the 
Lira, these investors would have made a profit on the futures and a loss on their 
balances; the opposite would have been true in case of a devaluation of the Italian 
currency.  
An additional explanation that contributes to the shedding of some light on the 
increment of the short positions must be sought in the liquidity crisis that hit the Italian 
forward market in the days prior to the devaluation. As the possibility to operate on that 
market was precluded, there might have been a number of transactions that were carried 
out on the Eurolira futures instead, thus incrementing the number of  positions on both 
sides of the market. 
 
4.2 The British currency crisis and the Short Sterling Futures. Credibility analysis on 
Sterling Pound/Deutsche Mark exchange rate in the months preceding the exit of 
the British currency from the ERM  
The speculative attack on the Sterling Pound took place in the days between the end of 
August and September 16. 
Besides direct intervention in the foreign exchange market, the Bank of England’s 
defense effort (see Table 3) called for the request of a VSTFF and the increase of the 
lending rate from 10 percent to 12 percent. The latter took place on September 16, 
together with the announcement of a further increase to 15% for the following day. This 
decision was not implemented as the British authorities decided to leave the ERM.  
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       Table 3 - Events and Bank of England’s policy during the crisis  
 
DATE EVENTS AND CENTRAL BANK’S POLICY EXCHANGE 
RATE 
1 DM=S.P. 
  3/9/92 The Bank of England announces a 5 billion ECU 
VSTFF 
0.358517   
15/9/92 Last trading day for Sterling Pound in the ERM 0.358677 
16/9/92 The Bank of England raises the lending rate from 
10% to 12% 
The Bank of England announces a further increase of 
the lending rate to 15% for September 17 
The Pound Sterling leaves the ERM. 
The Bank of England cancels the lending rate 
increase expected for the following day  
0.361731 
17/9/92 First day the Pound Sterling was floated 
The Bank of England decreases the lending rate to 
10% 
0.378417 
22/9/92 The Bank of England decreases the lending rate to 
9% 
0.395775 
16/10/92 The Bank of England decreases the lending rate to 
8% 
0.411289 
 
Throughout the attack on the Sterling Pound by the international speculation, the central 
bank’s reserves went from  $ 40.2 billion at the end of August to $ 31.7 billion at the 
end of September, $ 35.6 billion at the end of October and $ 35.9 billion at the end of 
November.   
Compared to the policy adopted by the Bank of Italy, the Bank of England’s defense 
intervention relied only marginally on changes of internal interest rates. In fact, interest 
rate increases represented the defense instrument of last resort for the British currency, 
utilized only a few hours before the Sterling Pound left the ERM. 
The great caution shown by the Bank of England in changing interest rates are part of  
the Bank’s time-honored tradition in the area of economic policy. 
Customarily, in fact, the extreme sensitivity of the British financial market, one of the 
world’s main financial centers in terms of volumes traded and internationally-oriented 
clientele, has always dictated a certain prudence to policy makers, and to the central 
bank in particular, concerning the choice of economic policies.    
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Fig. 4 – LIFFE Short Sterling maturing 12/92 
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Fig. 5 – LIFFE Short Sterling maturing 03/93 
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The credibility analyses on the Sterling Pound-Deutsche Mark exchange rate within the 
ERM were founded on the review of the Short Sterling futures contracts maturing 
December ‘92 and March ‘93. 
The technical features of futures are described below: 
 
Underlying Exchange Maturity Index Notional 
Value 
Type of 
Delivery 
Delivery 
Months 
Delivery 
Day 
Starting 
Date 
 3-Month 
Sterling Pound 
Interbank 
Deposits  
LIFFE 3  months  3-Month 
Interest 
Rate in 
Pounds 
500.000 Cash 
settlement 
March, 
June, 
September, 
December. 
First business 
day  prior 
third 
Wednesday 
November 
1982 
 
The daily quotes for the interbank market (it), the implicit yield (yt) and the maximum 
compatible with the band (i
t
∗ ) have been analyzed in the period included between 2/1/92 
and 14/9/92 for the contract with a December ‘92 expiration and in the period between 
1/4/92 and14/9/92 for the contract with a March ‘93 expiration. 
Fig. 4 shows the market’s confidence in the ability of the Sterling Pound to remain in 
the ERM. This outcome is different from the conclusions in Campa’s and Chang’s study 
where there is a lack of credibility starting from October ‘91 to September ‘92, with the 
only exception of May and June. It must be pointed out, however, that the two tests are 
not consistent as the mentioned authors carried theirs on options, while we ran ours on 
futures.  
The different maturity structure of the contracts on which the tests were performed 
explains the conflicting results. In fact, the lack of confidence between October ‘91 and 
September ‘92 was ascertained by Campa and Chang only for the 6-month call option 
contract, while for the 3-month call option contract there is a basic credibility condition 
for the period that preceded the crisis, in line with our results on the 3-month futures.   
The test carried out on the contract maturing March ‘93 allowed, instead, to investigate 
the credibility condition in the days close to September 14. 
The movement of  yt , it and  it
∗  for the months of August and September is shown in Fig. 
6 where the crisis period is analyzed in greater detail than in Fig. 5. This graph shows, 
starting from the 24 and 25 of August, positive values for  i i
t t
−
∗  and negative ones for 
y i
t t
−
∗  giving, therefore, contrasting information on the credibility of Sterling in the  
ERM  band  in  the days immediately preceding September 14. We see registered, 
moreover, between the 3 and 8 of September a sudden recovery of credibility due to the 
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announcement by the Bank of England on September 3 regarding a 5 billion ECU 
VSTFF. 
 30 
Fig. 6 – LIFFE Short Sterling maturing 03/93. Detailed analysis of the crisis period 
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Table 4 - August and September prices for Short Sterling Future maturing  
December 1992 
 
Date Exchange 
rate 
Opening   
Price 
   
ettlement 
Price 
 Highest 
Price 
 Lowest 
Price 
Open  
interest 
Volume 
Traded 
  Implicit 
yield 
  3/8/92 0,35190 89,76 89,80 89,81 89,72 52245 6884 10,20 
  4/8/92 0,35233 89,81 89,76 89,83 89,74 53084 11201 10,24 
  5/8/92 0,35327 89,73 89,71 89,76 89,64 52994 13181 10,29 
  6/8/92 0,35339 89,68 89,71 89,75 89,67 52405 10026 10,29 
  7/8/92 0,35312 89,76 89,74 89,80 89,72 53505 9775 10,26 
10/8/92 0,35351 89,73 89,80 89,81 89,73 54243 6880 10,20 
11/8/92 0,35365 89,79 89,79 89,82 89,73 56351 10925 10,21 
12/8/92 0,35389 89,78 89,73 89,81 89,71 56153 12241 10,27 
13/8/92 0,35465 89,69 89,69 89,72 89,65 56203 10152 10,31 
14/8/92 0,35496 89,66 89,82 89,83 89,62 57488 27622 10,18 
17/8/92 0,35488 89,78 89,75 89,81 89,73 58524 10000 10,25 
18/8/92 0,35497 89,73 89,67 89,74 89,65 60252 15494 10,33 
19/8/92 0,35563 89,63 89,68 89,70 89,62 62191 21374 10,32 
20/8/92 0,35539 89,68 89,64 89,74 89,62 64757 20051 10,36 
21/8/92 0,35592 89,67 89,52 89,67 89,42 68246 29419 10,48 
24/8/92 0,35692 89,35 89,26 89,39 89,21 72342 41215 10,74 
25/8/92 0,35784 89,26 89,08 89,31 89,00 71960 52366 10,92 
26/8/92 0,35831 89,14 89,17 89,22 89,00 74648 38585 10,83 
27/8/92 0,35795 89,22 89,18 89,30 89,16 74985 29941 10,82 
28/8/92 0,35845 89,21 89,14 89,22 89,11 75327 17084 10,86 
31/8/92 0,35805 NA 89,14 NA NA 75327 NA 10,86 
  1/9/92 0,35898 89,15 89,17 89,22 89,14 74421 15215 10,83 
  2/9/92 0,35893 89,17 89,40 89,46 89,16 73029 50442 10,60 
  3/9/92 0,35851 89,40 89,68 89,75 89,40 69704 48109 10,32 
  4/9/92 0,35538 89,78 89,69 89,89 89,54 71914 58496 10,31 
  7/9/92 0,35708 89,78 89,69 89,81 89,65 72527 16865 10,31 
  8/9/92 0,35840 89,69 89,46 89,75 89,42 75631 50457 10,54 
  9/9/92 0,35859 89,40 89,23 89,43 89,16 77135 63197 10,77 
10/9/92 0,35860 89,17 89,30 89,35 89,14 77350 42697 10,70 
11/9/92 0,35870 89,37 89,13 89,38 89,11 77311 50224 10,87 
14/9/92 0,35581 89,89 89,74 89,95 89,62 75555 66186 10,26 
15/9/92 0,35867 89,71 89,15 89,72 89,09 74736 93707 10,85 
16/9/92 0,36173 88,65 88,65 89,2 87,45 82184 172140 11,35 
17/9/92 0,37841 89,9 91,28 91,4 89,75 75496 119685   8,72 
 
Comparing these results with those in the preceding section on Italian futures, it is 
evident the condition of distrust in the ERM parity is for the Italian Lira much more 
explicit and rooted in time. This result is not simply due to the greater fluctuation the 
Sterling Pound was allowed within the ERM, but it basically shows that the British 
currency was deemed more reliable than the Italian currency for most of the period of 
the monetary crisis. 
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The examination of the volumes of Short Sterling futures contracts with a December ‘92 
maturity that changed hands (see Table 4) provides an additional analytical support of 
the test outlined in Fig. 6. In fact, in the first stage of the  change of expectations 
between August 24 and 25, volumes traded show a marked increment compared to the 
previous trading day, thus revealing a large increase in speculative positions in the 
futures market. 
As credibility was regained, from September 3 to September 8, volumes traded appear 
extremely volatile. In fact, those were days of great uncertainty for the foreign exchange 
market, both for the tensions arisen following the request for a VSTFF by the central 
bank, and for those originated by the outcome of the Bath conference on September 5. 
Lastly, it is interesting to notice the growth in speculative positions between September 
14 and September 16, a testimony to the perception of a possible departure of the 
Sterling from the ERM parity. 
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